🚨 The Exact Write-Up for the $15,000 "Forgotten Gmail" Internal System Bypass
Scroll to read the full report. The crucial manipulation step is hidden until you complete a free offer!
I. Executive Summary: The $15,000 Zero-Tool Bypass
This report details a **Critical Severity Broken Access Control** vulnerability discovered in the target application's Single Sign-On (SSO) implementation. The flaw was simple: they failed to implement proper domain verification during the final stage of login.
The result? Full access to the private **Internal System** using nothing but a standard, unverified Gmail account and a simple edit in the browser. This **zero-tool bypass** earned a Critical Severity rating and a **$15,000 payout**.
II. The Step-by-Step Exploit (The Unbelievable Mistake)
This exploit relies on manipulating the data passed between Google and the back-end system. The company's final check on the email domain was fundamentally flawed. Here is the initial setup:
**Initial Setup:** Navigate to the company's internal login page and click "Sign in with Google."
**Authentication:** Log in to Google using your personal, unverified **@gmail.com** account. Google successfully authenticates your identity.
🔒 CONTENT HIDDEN: THE ONE-WORD TRICK
You have completed the preparation steps. The final, critical **one-word change** that grants **Internal Access** is hidden.
Complete a short, free action to **instantly** reveal the full report, proof of concept, and the remediation steps.
III. The Flaw Discovered and The One-Word Trick
The core vulnerability was that the back-end was relying on a final domain check of the email address *after* Google confirmed the user's identity. Because the system was configured to accept any string containing the expected domain, the simple trick was to use **Response Manipulation** (via browser developer tools) to change the email domain from @gmail.com to @company.com. The server's weak validation logic accepted this as an internal user.
IV. Proof of Concept & Evidence of Access
With the single domain change, the system logged the unverified user directly into the private internal system. The access gained included viewing highly sensitive data:
Access to private internal **Discussions** and project boards.
Full directory of all **Employee Details** and contact information.
Viewing proprietary **Company Documentation** and unreleased information.
This zero-tool manipulation confirmed the exploit and led to the maximum payout.
V. Mitigation & How to Find More
The fix involved implementing strict, server-side validation to ensure that the user's email domain is verified *by Google's authoritative services* and matches the internal whitelist. Look for similar flaws where an application is too trusting of the client-side data provided during any SSO or OAuth flow.